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Abstract
We study the propagation of a malicious software in a network of mobile devices, which are
moving in a specific city area, and establish time bounds for the activation of a counter-
measure, i.e., an antivirus or a cleaner in order to prevent pandemic. More precisely, given an
initial infected population (mobile devices), we establish upper bounds on the time needed for
a counter-measure to take effect after infection (response-time), in order to prevent the rest
susceptible devices to get infected. Thus, within a period of time, we guarantee that not all
the susceptible devices in the city get infected and the infected ones get sanitized. In our work,
we first propose a malware propagation model along with a device mobility model and then,
utilizing these models, we develop a simulator that we use to study the spread of malware in
such networks. Finally, we provide experimental results for the pandemic prevention taken by
our simulator for various response-time intervals.
Keywords: Epidemics, Malicious software, Mobility models, Mobile devices, Graphs, Algo-
rithms, Simulation, Experimentation.
1 Introduction
A malicious software or malware may refer to any kind of software that its functionality causes
harm to a user, computer, or network. The motivation of our research is triggered by the enormous
grow and spread on the number of malicious software [10], and much more, on mobile devices. The
main difference between networks formed by devices connected via ethernet and networks formed
by mobile devices, is that the former are static while the later ones are dynamic networks (i.e.
networks that their representing graph changes during time - ad-hoc networks).
Epidemic Models Epidemic models can be applied to any network structures to describe the
propagation of a disease despite of its type (i.e., biological virus or computer virus) between a
set of entities. The overall propagation can be described as a branching process, e.g., a tree that
its root is the initial infected population and every level contains child nodes representing the
population infected by the nodes of the previous level.
Briefly speaking, such epidemic models describe the nodes - entities by a set of potential states
or conditions they can go through the course of the epidemic, namely Susceptible, Infected,
Repaired, Removed, Immune. In the Susceptible state a node is potentially vulnerable to a
disease, while when the node gets infected (probably by its neighbors) then it goes to Infected
state. On the other hand, depending on the modeled cases, if the disease is destructive for its
host then after a period of time the infected node goes to Removed state, while if a cure exist and
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is been applied to an infected node then after a period of time (throughout this paper we shall
call it sanitize-time) the node goes to Repaired state, where, depending again on the modeling
demands, it can be either Immune or not. Next, we briefly present various epidemic models that
can be deployed according to the needs of the simulated problem.
• SI Epidemic Model It the most trivial model containing only two states (Susceptible,
Infected). Once a node is susceptible and gets infected (and hence infectious), then it
remains forever in this state. The following epidemic models considered as variations of the
SI model. [1, 2, 6, 9].
• SIRp Epidemic Model In this model an infected node can be repaired in some fashion
[1,2,9]. To this point, it is worth noting that a node repair may provide immunization to the
host against the disease or not. Depending on this fact, the following specifications arise as
special cases of SIRp model:
◦ SII Epidemic Model The SII model (last I stands for Immune) results as a solution
when we need to formally describe the propagation of a disease where there exists a
cure that immunizes/sanitizes [14] the infected hosts after their treat [8, 9, 13].
◦ SIS Epidemic Model On the other hand, the SIS model (last S stands for Susceptible)
is suitable for the cases where even though exists a cure for the infected node, it still
stays susceptible on getting the disease again [9]
◦ SIRS Epidemic Model The SIS model is also referred as SIRS where the ‘R’ stands
for Repaired (i.e. ‘Rp’ in our case). A further specification may be appeared extending
SIS model depending on the case and the demands of the situation under modeling.
• SIRm Epidemic Model Finally, if the modeled disease is destructive for the infected host,
i.e., no cure exists, then SIRm model (last Rm stands for Removed) is suitable for application
in such case to model the epidemic.
• SEIS Epidemic Model The SEIS model introduces a new state (i.e. Exposed)takeing into
account the latent period of a disease where a node may be exposed to the disease by, for
example, a close contact with an infected node. In this model, any immunity has been left
to an infected node leaving an infected node to be susceptible again in the time after the
infection.
• SEIR Epidemic Model However, similarly to the case of SIRp model, the SEIR epidemic
model formally describes the propagation of a disease where there exists a cure that immu-
nizes or simply repairs an infected host, once has been firstly exposed and then infected by
the disease.
Related Work In [3], Bose and Shin investigate the propagation of mobile worms and viruses
that spread primarily via SMS/MMS messages and short-range radio interfaces such as Bluetooth.
In this work, they study the propagation of a mobile virus similar to Commwarrior in a cellular
network using data from a real-life SMS customer network, modeling each handheld device as an
autonomous mobile agent capable of sending SMS messages to others (via an SMS center) and
capable of discovering other Bluetooth equipped devices. Their results show that hybrid worms
that use SMS/MMS and proximity scanning (via Bluetooth) can spread rapidly within a cellular
network.
An interaction-based simulation framework to study the dynamics of worm propagation over
wireless networks developed by Channakeshava et al. [4]. This framework is constructed by their
proposed methods for generating synthetic wireless networks using activity-based models of urban
population mobility. With this framework they study how Bluetooth worms spread over realistic
wireless networks.
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In [5], Chen and Ji focus on modeling the spread of topological malware (spreads based on
topology information), as to understanding its potential damages, and developing countermeasures
to protect the network infrastructure. Their model is motivated by probabilistic graphs, using a
graphical representation to abstract the propagation of malwares that employ different scanning
methods. Utilizing a spatial-temporal random process they describe the statistical dependence
of malware propagation in arbitrary topologies. Finally, their results show that the independent
model outperforms the previous models, whereas the Markov model achieves a greater accuracy in
characterizing both transient and equilibrium behaviors of malware propagation.
Fleizach et al. [7], evaluate the effects of malware propagating using communication services
in mobile phone networks. Although self-propagating malware is well understood in the Internet,
mobile phone networks have very different characteristics in terms of topologies, services, pro-
visioning and capacity, devices, and communication patterns. To investigate malware in mobile
phone networks, they developed an event-driver simulator that captures the characteristics and
constraints of mobile phone networks, modeling realistic topologies and provisioned capacities of
the network infrastructure, as well as the contact graphs determined by cell phone address books.
Our Contribution In this paper we investigate the effect caused by the response-time of a
counter-measure (i.e., an antivirus or a cleaner) on the propagation of a malware in mobile devices.
For this purpose, we first propose a malware propagation model along with a device mobility
model and then we develop a simulator that we use to study the spread of malware in the network
formed by the mobile devices [12]. Our malware propagation model is based on the SIRp epidemic
model where the devices can be either in Susceptible, Infected or Repaired (Immunized) state.
Additionally, our device mobility model generates traces, utilizing shortest path algorithms, for the
mobile devices which are moving inside a city. Note that the city is represented by its image taken
from Google Maps and its town-planning is modeled by an n ×m matrix of 0s and 255s, where
0 denotes a point on a road while 255 denotes any obstacle. We utilize our malware propagation
and device mobility models and develop a simulator that we use to study the spread of malware
in mobile devices.
Given an initially infected population, we perform a series of simulations for various response-
time intervals, taking into account other factors which affect the malware’s propagation, i.e., ini-
tially infected population and network density, and establish upper bounds on the response-time
needed by a counter-measure, such as a malware detector [11], to take effect as to prevent pan-
demic. In other words, through our model we determine the maximum permitted time for a
counter-measure to be activated when a specific percentage of the population is infected in order
to guarantee that not all the susceptible devices in the city get infected and some (or, all) infected
ones get sanitized. We finally present experimental results for the pandemic prevention provided
by our simulations for various response-time intervals.
Road Map The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a malware propagation
model to simulate the spread of malware based on geological proximity and, then, a device mobility
model that generates traces for the mobile devices, utilizing shortest path algorithms, inside the
city represented by its image taken from Google Maps. In Section 3 we proceed by evaluating our
model and present results achieved by our simulator that deploys this model. Finally, Section 4
concludes the paper and discusses issues for farther investigation.
2 Model Design
In this section, we present our propagation model simulating the spread of a malware to proximal
mobile devices, as well as the mobility model and its main principles concerning the motion of the
devices in a city. Additionally, we show the representation of town-planning through an n × m
3
(a) Initial image from Google Maps (b) Gray-scale image
(c) Black and White image (d) Grid-snapshot of the Black and White image
Figure 1: (a)− (c) The transformation of a Google Maps image to a Black and White matrix; (d) Zoom-in
to a part of a Black and White image.
matrix consisted by 0s and 255s, where 0 denotes a point on a road of the city and 255 denotes
any obstacle (e.g., buildings) produced by an image taken from Google Maps.
2.1 City Representation
Our model simulates malware propagation to mobile devices that are changing their positions, or
geological coordinates, according to a town-planing. In order to make our simulation closer to
reality we used images of real towns-planning from Google Maps. We transform these images from
RGB to gray-scale color system and then to black and white using an appropriate threshold. Hence,
having an image of dimensions n×m representing the town-planing of the city, we transform it to
an n×m matrix Mmap with values 0s and 255s, where 0 represent a free space (i.e., road) and 255
represents any obstacle (i.e. building). So, in our simulation, we permit a mobile device to move
into a position with coordinates (x, y) if the corresponding cell (i, j) of matrix Mmap has value
0. Additionally, we have assigned a weight to each cell with value 0 in Mmap matrix to represent
its level of attraction, being hence a cold-, warm- or hot- spot, with weights w = 1, w = 5,
and w = 10 respectively. Next, we will discuss how these values are used in order to compute
a path from one point to another using a shortest path algorithm. In Figure 1 we illustrate the
construction of the town-planning representation.
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2.2 Malware Propagation Model
The proposed malware propagation model for simulating the malware’s spread to neighboring
mobile devices has its basis to factors that effect the spread such as the range of a mobile device,
the size of a malware in terms of packets, and the velocity of a node. In order to get infected,
a mobile device should have collect all the packets that constitute the malware. In our model for
simulating the propagation of malware we allow the activation of a counter-measure to remove
the malicious software from the infected devices. This feature is adapted to our model in order to
remove, or clean in some fashion, the malicious software from the device. Specifically, in our model,
if a device remains for a period of time (i.e., simulation steps demanded for the transmission of all
packets of the malware) within a specific radius from an infected device then it gets infected too.
However, if this device moves out of range then it would need more time, in terms of simulation
steps, in order to get infected. Upon the activation of a counter-measure, it sanitizes the device
by removing the malware.
In our model for simulating malware propagation in mobile devices, it is crucial to take into
account that such networks are formed on-the-fly between the devices while they are moving
inside the city. This network can be represented by an undirected graph (we shall denote it Gdev
throughout the paper) that is modifying its structure (i.e. topology by means of edge creations
and deletion among its nodes - devices). So, we could claim that during a specific period of time,
let [t1, tn] this graph can be referenced by its structurally different instances as G
1
dev, G
2
dev, ..., G
n
dev.
Definition 2.1 We define Gdev = (I, S, E) to be a bipartite graph whose vertices correspond to
the devices of the network and an edge between two vertices occur if their corresponding devices
have distance less than r at time t.
In Figure 2 we illustrate the process of constructing the bipartite graph Gdev. In Figure 2(a) we
depict how the mobile devices are moving inside a city represented by its Mmap matrix; recall
that cells with value 0 correspond to roads while cells with value 255 correspond to obstacles. The
circles around the mobile devices show the range of them while their colors, blue or red, correspond
to transmissions by susceptible or infected devices respectively. Then, in Figure 2(b), we illustrate
how we create the bipartite graph Gdev: for any pair of mobile devices (i.e., vertices in the Gdev),
we add an edge between them in Gdev if their distance is less than r. Concerning the above network
represented by Gdev, next we provide some definitions about its characteristics.
Definition 2.2 Let τ1, τ2, ..., τk be the k states of a given epidemic model E. We define the state-
cover C(τ∗) of state τ∗ ∈ {τ1, τ2, ..., τk} as the rate of the objects (i.e., mobile devices) that are in
state τ∗ by the sum of the objects that are in any state of the epidemic model E, that is
C(τ∗) =
|τ∗|
∑k
i=1 |τi|
. (1)
In our model, for the infected state I and the susceptible state S, we compute the Infected-cover
and the Susceptible-cover as follows:
C(I) =
|I|
|S|+ |I|+ |Rp|
and C(S) =
|S|
|S|+ |I|+ |Rp|
, (2)
respectively, where |Rp| is the number of devices in the repaired state Rp of our model.
Definition 2.3 Let τ∗
1
, τ∗
2
∈ {τ1, τ2, ..., τk} be two states of a given epidemic model E. We define
the state-rate R(τ∗
1
τ∗
2
) of states τ∗
1
and τ∗
2
as the rate of the number of the objects belonging to τ∗
1
state over the number of objects that belong to τ∗
1
state plus 1, that is
R(τ∗
1
, τ∗
2
) =
|τ∗
1
|
|τ∗
2
|+ 1
. (3)
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(b) The graph Gdev
Figure 2: Mobile devices moving inside a city represented by its Mmap matrix, constructing the bipartite
graph Gdev by the links formed among them.
In our model, the state-rates IS-rate and SI-rate for the infected state I and the susceptible
state S are the following:
R(I, S) =
|I|
|S|+ 1
and R(S, I) =
|S|
|I|+ 1
, (4)
respectively.
2.3 Device Mobility Model
In our model, we simulate the movements of a mobile device by changing the coordinates of a
node taking into account the corresponding cells (i, j) in the Mmap matrix with values 0 and 255
that represents the town-planning. More precisely, we permit a device to move on a point in the
map if the corresponding cell (i, j) in Mmap matrix has value 0 since such a cell represents a road
or, equivalently, we do not allow a device to move on a cell with value 255 since it represents any
obstacle such as building. To make our simulation more realistic, we propose and implement a trace
generator for device mobility, that is, for each node we generate a trace between an initial position
and a target position. In particular, we set each node at a pre-defined point with coordinates (i, j)
on the grid and then a destination point (i′, j′) is assigned on that as to be reached through a path
computed by a shortest path algorithm computed on the weighted directed graph we define next,
and which we shall call it Gmap.
Definition 2.4 The weighted directed graph Gmap represents the town’s planning using its Mmap
representation; it is constructed as follows:
◦ its vertices V (Gmap) correspond to the 0-value cells of matrix Mmap, and
◦ two vertices of V (Gmap) are joined by an edge if their corresponding cells with value 0 are
adjacent in the Mmap matrix; note that, a 0-value cell (i, j) of Mmap is adjacent to every
0-value cell in its 8-neighborhood. The weight of an edge (ui, vi) in E(Gmap) has value
10 − wui + 10 − wvi + 1, where wui and wvi are the attraction levels of nodes ui and vi,
respectively.
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(e) The graph Gmap
Figure 3: Map representation and undirected weighted graph construction.
In Figure 3, we show in detail the construction of the graph Gmap from the Mmap matrix. In
particular, in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) we show the black/white representation of an example map
representing each point of a road with value 0 (black) and any obstacle (building) with value 255
(white), in Figure 3(c) we show the attraction level matrix which is constructed by assigning to its
cells values in the range [1, 10] depicting the cold-, warm- and hot- spot of the city, in Figure 3(d)
we assign an ID on each point, indicating a node on the Gmap graph, while in Figure 3(e) we present
the resulting graph Gmap.
To this point, it is worth noting to refer that the destination points are not randomly assigned
as for each device we select a destination that is located to the NW, N, NE, W, E, SW, S, SE boundaries
of the map, where once a destination reached by a mobile device, then a new destination point is
assigned and thus we guarantee that always the devices change their positions.
Finally, deepen into the relation between the graphs Gmap and Gdev we can claim that the
structure of Gdev strongly dependents on the structure of Gmap. The relation between these two
graphs relies on the property that the density of Gdev (by means of sparse or dense graphs) is
affected by the cardinalities of vertex sets V (Gdev) and V (Gmap), as the cardinality of edge set
E(Gdev), which determines the density of Gdev, is inversely analogous to cardinality of V (Gmap).
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Definition 2.5 For a given set of mobile devices, say, dev, that are moving inside a city repre-
sented by its corresponding Gmap we define the density of this network (i.e., Gdev), denoting it
with D as follows:
D(dev,Gmap) =
|I|+ |S|
|V (Gmap)|
, (5)
where |I| and |S| correspond to the number of infected and susceptible devices respectively, and from
which it follows that for a given number of devices, say, n, the higher the cardinality of |V (Gmap)|
the less the density of Gdev.
3 Evaluation
In this section, we present the setup of our experiments performed by our simulator that deploys
our malware propagation and device mobility models. We perform a series of simulations focusing
mainly on the effect of response-time demanded by a counter-measure to be activated in order to
clean up the infected devices, minimizing or eliminating the IS-rate, i.e., R(I, S) = 0.
3.1 Experimental Design
In the framework of this paper, we are interested in investigating the effect of the time a counter-
measure needs to be activated (i.e., response-time) on the malware’s propagation when it is been
triggered by an after-infection time limit and also, in a second level, how other factors such as the
size of a malware, the density of the network and the initial infected population affect the spread of
malware. Specifically, we distinguish two categories of experiments both investigating the effect of
the counter-measure’s response-time on the spread of the malware: the first category concerns the
activation of the counter-measure on each device by setting the response-time to various intervals,
while the second one concerns the effect of other factors, such as the density of the network, and
the initial size of the infected population.
In our experiments, we utilize the image of a city taken from Google Maps, transforming it to a
black and white matrix, as we described in the previous section. Within this approach, we assign
weights (attraction levels) to each cell (i, j) with value 0; recall that, cells with such values represent
points on a road. Based on these values, we compute shortest paths for a set of start-destination
points for each mobile device utilizing a shortest path algorithm. Next we present results for a
series of experiments for malware consisted by 3 and 6 packets for various response time intervals
and IS-rate R(I, S) = 0.25 having an initially infected population consisted by 20 devices and and
initial susceptible population consisted by 80 devices, i.e., I = 20 and S = 80.
In the two categories of experiments presented, we study different intervals of values concerning
the response-time of a counter-measure; note that, not all the devices have the same response-time
but on each one is assigned a response-time of the interval under consideration. Additionally,
using the same categories of experiments we investigate the effect of the malware size, expressed in
packets, and show how it can affect the result on both categories. In both categories of experiments,
we perform a set of simulations on malware spread between moving devices in a city region. In
the first category we keep the same ratio of the initial infected population and susceptible devices
varying the counter-measure response time, while in the second one we increase the initial infected
population and the network’s density.
Throughout the paper, we shall denote the initial infected population by I, the susceptible
devices by S, the counter-measure response time by Rt and the malware’s size by p. To this point
we ought to notice that the Rt = t does not actually corresponds to t simulation steps but in the
case where the size p of the malwere (in terms of packs) is greater that 1 it holds Rt = t× p, that
means, the infected device will propagate t times the full malware, and thus t× p simulation steps
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(a) p = 3, Rt ∈ [1, 5], R(I, S) = 0.25 (b) p = 6, Rt ∈ [1, 5], R(I, S) = 0.25
(c) p = 3, Rt ∈ [6, 10], R(I, S) = 0.25 (d) p = 6, Rt ∈ [6, 10], R(I, S) = 0.25
(e) p = 3, Rt ∈ [11, 20], R(I, S) = 0.25 (f) p = 6, Rt ∈ [11, 20], R(I, S) = 0.25
(g) p = 3, Rt ∈ [21, 40], R(I, S) = 0.25 (h) p = 6, Rt ∈ [21, 40], R(I, S) = 0.25
(i) p = 3, Rt ∈ [41, 80], R(I, S) = 0.25 (j) p = 6, Rt ∈ [41, 80], R(I, S) = 0.25
Figure 4: Simulation experiments for different values of malware packets (p) and various counter-measure
response times (Rt).
are required before its counter-measure been activated. In Figures 4, 5 and 6, the x− axis refers
to the simulation steps taken up to the end of simulation, while the y− axis refers to the number
of infected devices.
3.2 Pandemic Prevention for Various Response-time Intervals
As we can observe in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), the size of the spreading malware does not affect
the spread at all since the response time is low. That means, the propagation of malware to
neighboring susceptible devices fails, despite its size, due to the early activation of the counter-
measure. However, the duplication of the size of the malware leads to the duplication on the
time required for all the susceptible devices in the city to avoid the infection and all infected ones
get sanitized. Moreover, increasing the counter-measure response time inside the same order of
magnitude, we observe that still there is no increase on the number of the infected population,
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where in both cases (see, Figures 4(c) and 4(d)) the number of infected population, from the start
of simulation, is monotonically decreasing since the cure has started once the counter measure has
been activated.
On the other hand, leaving the rest parameters unchanged and increasing only the response-
time of the counter-measure, we observe a global maximum of the spread in both experiments (see,
Figures 4(e) – 4(f) and Figures 4(g) – 4(h)) which are achieved on the 70th and 160th simulation
steps, and on the 110th and 260th simulation steps respectively. In both cases the maxima are
due to the multiplication of the response-time Rt by a factor f that causes the infected devices to
propagate the full malware f times more than in the previous experiments. However in both cases
the malware failed to spread to all the population since for the specific parameters (i.e., p = 3 and
p = 6) the counter-measure activated early enough and thus the pandemic is prevented.
Finally, in Figure 4(i) we can see that further increase of the response-time interval, in the case
of a malware of smaller size (i.e., p = 3), lets the malware spread to all the susceptible devices.
However, for the same response-time interval but with double malware size (i.e., p = 6) (see,
Figure 4(j)), we observe that the infection failed to spread to all the susceptible devices. Note
that, an increase on the response-time facilitates the propagation of small size malware.
3.3 Other Results on Pandemic Prevention
Next we present results for a series of experiments for malware consisted by 3 and 6 packets
for various response time intervals. We change some factors concerning the characteristics of the
network (i.e., Gdev) and firstly perform a series of experiments for a different IS-rate R(I, S) = 0.66
having an initially infected population consisted by 40 devices and and initial susceptible population
consisted by 60 devices, i.e., I = 40 and S = 60, while then we increase the densityD of our network
by duplicating the number of devices keeping the IS-rate equal to that of Figure 4; recall that,
R(I, S) = 0.25, where I = 40 and S = 160.
The results of the second category of our experiments are depicted in Figures 5 and 6. In this
category, we modify the experiments of Figures 4(a) – 4(b), 4(e) – 4(f) and 4(i) – 4(j), changing
the ratio I/S from 0.25 to 0.66 (see, Figure 5) and the density D of the network by duplicating the
number of devices (see, Figure 6); recall that, I and S denote the number of the initial infected
and susceptible population, respectively.
It is rational to expect that in presence of an early activated counter-measure (i.e., response-
time intervals close to 0) a quick response is crucial for the immediate repression of malware’s
propagation. So, response-time intervals close to 0, act the same for pandemic prevention despite
the size of the initial infected population, as shown in the results contrasting Figures 5(a) and 5(b)
with Figures 4(a) and 4(b), where the prevention of a pandemic needs almost the same number of
simulation steps for these couples of experiments (see, Figures 5(a) – 4(a) and 5(b) – 4(b)).
Comparing Figures 5(c) and 5(d) with Figures 4(e) and 4(f), respectively, we observe that
in the first case the flow of the propagation follows a decreasing monotonicity, with less or none
grows (see, Figure 5(c) and Figure 4(e) for a 3-packet malware), that is attributed to the number
of available susceptible devices as also to the activation of the counter-measure that involves the
immunization of the infected host. Additionally, comparing Figure 5(d) with Figure 4(f), where
the size of the spreading malware is duplicated, we observe a slower growth on the number of
infected devices (grow-level). This observation can be explained by the fact that as more packets
needed to infect a device it slows down the infection and, thus, the activation of the the counter-
measure requires more simulation steps. So, the infected devices with response-time near the upper
bound of the assigned interval have more time to infect other susceptible devices and, hence, in
this case the whole pandemic prevention of Figure 5(d) demands more simulation steps than in the
case depicted in Figure 4(f) (i.e., 550 and 430, respectively).
However, comparing Figure 5(e) and 5(f) with Figure 4(i) and 4(j), respectively, we observe
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(a) p = 3, Rt ∈ [1, 5], R(I, S) = 0.66 (b) p = 6, Rt ∈ [1, 5], R(I, S) = 0.66
(c) p = 3, Rt ∈ [11, 20], R(I, S) = 0.66 (d) p = 6, Rt ∈ [11, 20], R(I, S) = 0.66
(e) p = 3, Rt ∈ [41, 80], R(I, S) = 0.66 (f) p = 6, Rt ∈ [41, 80], R(I, S) = 0.66
Figure 5: Simulation experiments for the cases of a malware with p = 3 and p = 6 for a network with
double initially infected devices.
interesting evidences about our intuition that the number of initially infected devices could signif-
icantly speed up the propagation of malware in such a network. So, in the experiments depicted
in Figure 5(e) and 5(f) we observe that in both cases the counter-measure’s activation, due to its
larger response time, failed to prevent pandemic, in contrast to the case of experiments presented
in Figure 4(i) and 4(j), where while in Figure 4(i) a malware of smaller size achieved to propagate
infecting all the susceptible devices in the network, in Figure 4(j) we observe that in contrast with
Figure 5(f), the pandemic failed obviously due to the number of initial infected population.
In the second set of experiments for malware propagation in a network of mobile devices with
double density of the network on which the experiments of Figure 4 performed we observe a
differentiation on the malware’s spread behavior where, while in the case of a 6-packet malware
(see, Figures 6(b) and 4(b)) no significant variations arise, in the case of a 3-packet malware’s
spread (see, Figures 6(a) and 4(a)), it is obvious that in the first case the increased number of
initially infected devices acts subsidiary to the malware’s spread making the propagation lasting
longer as for a greater period of time (in terms of simulation steps) there still exist infected devices
in the network.
Contrasting Figures 4(e) and 4(f) with Figures 6(c) and 6(d), we observe the same behavior
in malware’s spread, where in both cases the propagation exhibits a global maximum, however,
a more detailed view, could reveal that in the first case (see, Figures 6(c) and 6(d)), where the
density of the network is duplicated the whole pandemic prevention lasts less than in the first one
(see, Figures 4(e) and 4(f)) in terms of simulation steps. Comparing Figure 4(e) and 4(f) with
Figure 6(c) and 6(d), we observe that the network’s density (as also the initial infected population,
see Figures 5(c) and 5(d)) do not affect the prevention of a pandemic when a properly activated
counter-measure exists. This result is explained by the fact that since the counter-measure acts
the same way in both cases, in the 50th simulation step 20 and 130 devices have been sanitized
(see, Figures 4(e) and 6(c), respectively).
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(a) p = 3, Rt ∈ [1, 5], R(I, S) = 0.25 (b) p = 6, Rt ∈ [1, 5], R(I, S) = 0.25
(c) p = 3, Rt ∈ [11, 20], R(I, S) = 0.25 (d) p = 6, Rt ∈ [11, 20], R(I, S) = 0.25
(e) p = 3, Rt ∈ [41, 80], R(I, S) = 0.25 (f) p = 6, Rt ∈ [41, 80], R(I, S) = 0.25
Figure 6: Simulation experiments for the cases of a malware with p = 3 and p = 6 a network with double
density.
Finally, comparing Figures 6(e) and 6(f) with Figures 4(i) and 4(j), respectively, also inter-
esting evidences arise about our intuition that an increase on the density of the network could
significantly speed up the propagation of malware. More precisely, in Figures 6(e) and 6(f) we ob-
serve that in both cases the counter-measure’s activation, due to its larger response time, failed to
prevent pandemic, in contrast to the case of experiments presented in Figures 4(i) and 4(j), where
while in Figure 4(i) a malware of smaller size achieved to propagate infecting all the susceptible
devices in the network, in Figure 4(j), the pandemic failed obviously due to the malware’s size.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this work we investigate the effect of the response-time of a counter-measure and establish time
bounds that prevent pandemic of a malware in mobile devices moving in an area of a city. We
first proposed a malware propagation model to simulate the spread of malware based on geological
proximity and, then, a device mobility model that generates traces for the mobile devices, utilizing
shortest path algorithms, inside the city represented by its image taken from Google Maps. Finally,
we developed a simulator for malware spread among mobile devices, implementing the models
proposed above, and performed a series of experiments providing results on the effect of counter-
measure response-time on malware’s spread.
In light of our proposed models in this paper it would be very interesting to explore the dynamics
of other epidemic models such as the SIRp where an infected node can move to a repaired state (but
still vulnerable). An interesting direction could be the investigation of cases where the counter-
measure does not immunize the infected host against malware and hence the system occasionally
may come under an endless stable equipoise between the infected and susceptible population.
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